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INTRODUCTION 
The reform goal of promoting reasonable consistency and reducing 
disparity in sentencing is meaningless without a frame of reference—
consistency or disparity relative to what underlying principles?1 In order to 
decide that two offenders are similarly situated and thus should receive similar 
sentences (or that they are dissimilar and should receive different sentences) we 
must first define the relevant sentencing factors (the offense and offender 
characteristics that judges should consider in determining appropriate 
sentences) and the weight to be given to each of these factors. The choice and 
weighting of sentencing factors depends, in turn, on the punishment purposes 
which the sentence is supposed to serve. 
 
∗ Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota. I would 
like to thank Kevin Reitz and Michael Tonry for their helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this Article. 
1. See Anthony N. Doob, The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines: If You 
Don’t Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not Get There, in THE POLITICS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 199, 233-35 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995); Paul J. Hofer 
& Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 36-37 (2003); Peter Westen, 
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
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Sentences can serve many purposes, and these purposes are often in 
conflict. Some of the most difficult conflicts are between proportionality 
principles, on the one hand, and case-specific crime-control or restorative-
justice purposes, on the other. Proportionality serves both retributive (just 
deserts) and practical (utilitarian) sentencing purposes. Under a retributive 
theory, sanctions should be scaled in proportion to each offender’s 
blameworthiness, and equally culpable offenders should receive equally severe 
sanctions. Sentencing proportionality and uniformity also have practical 
benefits, such as reinforcing public views of relative crime seriousness and 
maintaining public respect for criminal laws and the criminal justice system. 
But realizing the goal of efficiently preventing future crime sometimes 
requires unequal or disproportional treatment. For example, if two first-time 
offenders commit the same crime but one has genuine feelings of remorse, 
strong family ties, and other indications of amenability to supervision and low 
risk of reoffending, putting that offender on probation and sending his much 
riskier counterpart to prison saves scarce correctional resources while still 
promoting public safety. But doing so produces disparate sentences for equally 
culpable offenders and undercuts the practical values served by uniformity and 
proportionality. 
The best solution to conflicts such as this is not to adopt a narrow 
punishment theory (e.g., one based solely on retributive or risk-management 
goals), but rather to design a hybrid sentencing system that gives appropriate 
scope to all legitimate sentencing purposes. The hybrid approach adopted by 
most state guidelines systems is a version of the theory of limiting 
retributivism. Under this approach, principles of uniformity and proportionality 
relative to crime seriousness and offender desert set upper and lower limits on 
sentencing severity. Within the range defined by these limits, other principles 
provide the necessary fine-tuning of the sentence imposed in a particular case. 
These other principles include not only traditional crime-control purposes such 
as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but also a concept known as 
parsimony—a preference for the least severe alternative that will achieve the 
purposes of the sentence. The parsimony principle recognizes that severe 
penalties are expensive and usually harmful to offenders and that the crime-
control benefits of such penalties are uncertain and often quite limited. Severe 
penalties should therefore be used as sparingly as possible. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of contemporary sentencing 
purposes and discusses some of the many ways in which these purposes 
conflict with each other. Part II describes the theory of limiting retributivism 
and shows the widespread support that exists for this theory among sentencing 
philosophers, in model codes and standards, and in contemporary sentencing 
law and practice, particularly in state guidelines systems. Several illustrative 
cases are used to show how limiting retributivism reconciles conflicting 
punishment purposes. The Conclusion emphasizes the importance of clearly 
defining and reconciling such purposes, both in designing a sentencing system 
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and in deciding what sanctions are appropriate in a given case. It also offers 
suggestions for how courts and Congress could reinforce the limiting 
retributive elements which are implicit in the Federal Guidelines’ enabling 
legislation. 
I. OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY SENTENCING PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 
Unless criminal penalties serve valid purposes, they impose useless costs 
and hardship. Even when the purposes are valid, punishment may be limited by 
moral values or practical concerns. Punishment purposes are positive, justifying 
principles; punishment limitations are negative, restraining principles. It is 
important to clearly define these positive and negative principles and to guide 
judges in their application. 
In an indeterminate sentencing system,2 the legislature usually only 
provides a very general, all-inclusive list of sentencing purposes and 
limitations, giving little or no guidance to system actors (prosecutors, trial and 
appellate judges, parole and other correctional officials) as to how these 
principles should be defined and applied in specific cases. Some state 
guidelines commissions have provided such definitions and guidance.3 The 
United States Sentencing Commission chose not to,4 and federal trial and 
appellate judges have not done so either.5 As a result, federal sentencing is no 
more coherent and principled today than it was before the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines were adopted. The overall structure and specific provisions of the 
existing Guidelines lack any clear underlying or principled basis, and judges 
called upon to interpret the Guidelines have thus been left to invoke whatever 
purposes and limitations they prefer. 
Why should violators of criminal laws be punished, and what principles 
should be recognized to limit the type and degree of punishment?6 Punishment 
purposes and limitations are traditionally grouped in two categories: utilitarian 
and nonutilitarian. Utilitarian purposes and limitations seek to achieve 
beneficial effects (or a net benefit) and, in particular, lower frequency and/or 
seriousness of future criminal acts by this offender or others. Nonutilitarian 
 
2. For further discussion of such systems, see infra text accompanying note 8. 
3. See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 8-
13, at 35 (1980). 
4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004); Doob, supra note 1, at 246; 
see infra text accompanying notes 49-55 (discussing support for limiting retributivism in 
guidelines statute). But see Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 1, at 51-52 (claiming that 
modified just deserts theory, a form of limiting retributivism, is implicit in and provides the 
most coherent explanation for the Federal Guidelines). 
5. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 1 passim (finding scant theory in guidelines 
case law). 
6. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 1282-94 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
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punishment purposes and limitations embody principles of justice and fairness 
which are viewed as ends in themselves, without regard to whether they 
produce any particular social or individual benefit. 
While these two major categories of punishment purposes and limitations 
are conceptually separate, in practice they are often closely linked. As 
discussed more fully below, although proportionality and uniformity in 
sentencing are often claimed to be ends in themselves, each also has important 
utilitarian value. Sentences which depart greatly from widely held views of 
proportionality and uniformity may fail to prevent future crime and may even 
encourage crime by undermining the public’s ability to gauge the relative 
seriousness of crimes and by lessening respect for criminal laws and the 
criminal justice system. 
A. Utilitarian Purposes and Limitations 
The most widely adopted utilitarian sentencing principles focus on using 
criminal penalties to prevent or lessen the seriousness of future criminal acts by 
the offender being sentenced and/or by other, would-be offenders. Criminal 
penalties have the potential to achieve these crime-control effects through at 
least five causal mechanisms: rehabilitation, incapacitation, specific 
deterrence, general deterrence, and denunciation. Each of these methods 
depends on certain critical assumptions and conditions for its effectiveness. 
The first three methods seek to prevent future crimes by this particular 
offender; these methods thus assume both that certain defendants have an 
elevated risk of reoffending (justifying special measures addressed toward them 
specifically) and that these offenders and their degree of elevated risk can be 
identified in advance. Rehabilitation further assumes that the offender has 
identifiable and treatable problems which cause him to commit crimes; this 
approach seeks to reduce the offender’s future criminality by addressing those 
causes through education and treatment in prison or in a nonprison program. 
Incapacitation prevents crime by imprisoning high-risk offenders, thus 
physically restraining them from committing further crimes against the public. 
This crime-control method assumes not only that such offenders can be reliably 
identified but also that they are not made worse by imprisonment, and that—
while in custody—they are not replaced by other offenders.7 Specific 
deterrence (also known as special or individual deterrence) seeks to discourage 
the defendant from committing further crimes by instilling fear of receiving the 
same or a more severe penalty in the future. 
Rehabilitation and incapacitation are the most important sentencing 
purposes underlying traditional indeterminate sentencing systems.8 Judges are 
 
7. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 146 (rev. ed. 1983). 
8. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 4, 6 (1996); Steven L. Chanenson, The 
Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 385-86 (2005); Richard S. Frase, The 
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given very broad discretion to assess the degree of risk posed by the offender, 
diagnose the causes of that risk, assess whether those causes can effectively and 
safely be treated without incarceration, and, if they cannot, decide the 
maximum and sometimes the minimum term of incarceration. Within the 
maximum and any minimum prison term set by the judge, correctional officials 
and parole boards are given very broad discretion to further assess the causes of 
the offender’s criminality, the best treatment options available to address those 
causes, and the precise moment at which, due to prison programming and/or 
other factors (e.g., maturation or aging) the offender can be safely released. To 
a lesser extent, indeterminate sentencing regimes also promote specific 
deterrence. Sentencing judges can use their discretion to determine whether the 
defendant poses an elevated risk of reoffending, and if so, what additional 
punishment is needed to offset that risk. 
Such highly discretionary determinations of risk, treatment needs, and 
offender deterrability are very difficult to make reliably and consistently. For 
this reason, indeterminate sentencing began to fall out of favor in the 1970s.9 
Mounting evidence revealed that virtually identical offenders receive very 
different sentences from different judges. Similarly, broad parole discretion fell 
out of favor because of the different treatment given to similar offenders and 
the inherent difficulty of assessing individualized risk and progress toward 
reform on the basis of behavior in prison (some model prisoners behave much 
worse in the community than they did in the highly controlled prison 
environment; other offenders adapt poorly to the prison regimen but behave 
much better when released). 
The fourth and fifth crime-control methods, general deterrence and 
denunciation, are designed to prevent future crimes by members of the public at 
large or certain subgroups believed to have an elevated risk of offending. 
General deterrence seeks to discourage would-be offenders from committing 
further crimes by instilling a fear of receiving the penalty given to this 
offender.10 General deterrent effects depend on a number of factors: the 
severity of the penalty; the swiftness with which it is imposed; the probability 
of being caught and punished; the target group’s perceptions of the severity, 
swiftness, and certainty of punishment; the extent to which members of the 
target group suffer from addiction, mental illness, or other conditions which 
significantly diminish their capacity to obey the law; and the extent to which 
these would-be offenders face competing pressures or incentives to commit 
crime. As a result of the combined impact of these factors, some offenses and 
offenders are likely to be easily deterred by the threat of criminal penalties; at 
 
Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. 1, 7 (1993) [hereinafter Frase, 
Uncertain Future]. 
9. See, e.g., AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); TONRY, supra 
note 8, at 7, 9-10; Frase, Uncertain Future, supra note 8, at 7-9. 
10. See FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT 
IN CRIME CONTROL 72-73 (1973). 
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the other extreme, some offenses and offenders are essentially undeterrable. 
Several of the deterrence factors listed above interact. For example, a 
major increase in penalty severity may cause a decrease in the swiftness and/or 
certainty of punishment. This is because severe penalties give offenders a 
stronger incentive to vigorously contest the charges and may make prosecutors, 
judges, and juries reluctant to consistently impose such penalties. Research has 
found that offenders are more sensitive to the probability of punishment than to 
its severity.11 Thus, increased severity may cause crime rates to remain the 
same or even increase. 
Punishment can also prevent crime by means of more diffuse processes 
that depend on internalized values rather than fear of punishment. Through 
denunciation (also referred to as the communicative, educative, or expressive 
function of punishment, or as positive general prevention) criminal penalties 
serve to define and reinforce important social norms of law-abiding behavior 
and relative crime seriousness.12 Such norms guide and restrain behavior even 
when the chances of detection and punishment are slight. Given the many 
difficulties of preventing crime by rehabilitation, incapacitation, or deterrent 
threats, norm-reinforcement is probably the most important crime-preventive 
effect of punishment (but also the most difficult to measure, since its effects are 
so diffuse and long term). 
In addition to crime control, sentences may achieve several other important 
utilitarian purposes: promoting satisfaction, closure, and/or compensation for 
crime victims and victimized communities; reassuring the public that 
something is being done about crime; and facilitating the offender’s successful 
reintegration into society. Each of these effects is desirable for its own sake but 
may also help to prevent future crimes by the defendant or other would-be 
offenders. 
Utilitarian theory also imposes several important limitations on the form or 
severity of punishment. Criminal penalties should not cost more than the 
benefits they achieve or cause individual or social harms which outweigh their 
crime-controlling effects or other benefits.13 Punishment should also be 
efficient. Penalties should not be more severe or more costly than necessary; if 
the same crime-control and other benefits can be achieved with less severe or 
 
11. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE 
SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 5, 47 (1999). The tradeoffs noted in text also 
explain why, in practice, mandatory minimum penalties provide little crime benefit and 
make sentencing outcomes less, not more, uniform. See TONRY, supra note 8, at 134-64. 
12. See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1286-87; Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, The 
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468-77 (1997). 
13. See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the 
Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 593-95 
(2005) [hereinafter Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences] (discussing utilitarian ends 
proportionality principle). 
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less costly methods, those methods should be preferred.14 In a world of limited 
resources, punishment must also be prioritized. Prison beds and other scarce 
correctional resources should be reserved for the most socially harmful offenses 
and offenders. Prisons must also not be used beyond their effective capacities. 
Overcrowded prisons are unsafe for prisoners and staff, and reduced security 
and resources for programming increase the odds that prisoners will leave 
prison more violent or antisocial than when they entered. (Overcrowded prisons 
are also likely to violate nonutilitarian principles, in particular the right to 
humane treatment discussed below.) 
B. Nonutilitarian Purposes and Limitations 
Retribution is the most widely recognized nonutilitarian sentencing 
principle. Under this theory, offenders should be punished in proportion to their 
blameworthiness (or desert) in committing the crime being sentenced. Two 
basic elements determine an offender’s degree of blameworthiness: the nature 
and seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime and the 
offender’s degree of culpability in committing the crime.15 Culpability depends 
on several factors: the offender’s intent (deliberate wrongdoing is more 
culpable than criminal negligence); his or her capacity to obey the law (which 
may be diminished by mental disease or defect, chemical dependency, or 
situational factors such as threats or other strong inducements to commit the 
crime); the offender’s motives for committing the crime (which may mitigate 
or aggravate culpability); and, for multi-defendant crimes, the defendant’s role 
in the offense as instigator, leader, follower, primary actor, or minor player. 
Retribution can serve both as a purpose (positive justification) for 
punishment and as a limitation on penalties imposed to achieve other purposes. 
The purpose theory views retribution as the primary or even exclusive goal of 
punishment—offenders are punished simply because they deserve to be and the 
severity of their punishment should be no more and no less than they deserve. 
The underlying moral arguments supporting this view often involve claims of 
fairness: fairness to the victim and the victim’s family (whose right to seek 
vengeance is supplanted by the criminal law); fairness to law-abiding persons 
(who refrained from committing this offense); and fairness to the defendant 
(who, according to this theory, has a right to be punished in proportion to his 
blameworthiness). 
As discussed more fully in Part II, the limiting (negative) version of 
retributive theory merely sets outer limits on punishment, defining a range of 
permissible severity for any given case. In terms of the fairness arguments 
 
14. Id. at 595-96 (discussing utilitarian means proportionality principle); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 24-29 (discussing the parsimony principle). 
15. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 29-33 (1993); Frase, Excessive 
Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 590. 
FRASE PUNISHMENT PURPOSES 58 STAN. L. REV. 67 10/28/2005 1:24:58 PM 
74 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:67 
summarized above, retributive limits defining the minimum acceptable penalty 
reflect concerns about fairness to victims, law-abiding persons, and other 
offenders; upper-retributive limits, defining the maximum allowable penalty, 
reflect the widely shared sense that it is fundamentally unfair and an abuse of 
governmental power to punish an offender more severely than he deserves. 
Uniformity is another very important nonutilitarian sentencing principle; 
similarly situated offenders should receive similar punishments. But uniformity 
is not a self-sufficient criterion; as was noted at the outset, concepts of 
uniformity and disparity always require reference to some other principle or 
principles which render two offenders similarly situated. In recent years 
retributive values have been the most common reference principle. This 
combination of retributive and uniformity principles is often called the Theory 
of Just Deserts; offenders of comparable blameworthiness (in terms of social 
harm and offender culpability) should receive similar penalties, and offenders 
differing in blameworthiness should be punished in proportion to their 
respective degrees of blame.16 
Like retribution, uniformity is based on concepts of fairness—fairness to 
other offenders (who could justly complain if this defendant received a lighter 
penalty for the same conduct), and fairness to the defendant (who could justly 
complain if he were punished more severely than other equally blameworthy 
offenders). Uniformity can be a positive sentencing purpose, defining an exact 
quantum of appropriate punishment, or a limiting principle, defining a range of 
allowable penalties designed to prevent gross disparities without seeking to 
impose exact equality. 
The civil and human rights of defendants provide another set of 
nonutilitarian limiting principles. The requirement of humane treatment forbids 
torture, dismemberment, and other brutal physical or psychological 
punishments, without regard to whether some offenders might be thought to 
deserve such penalties or whether the penalties could be deemed necessary and 
effective to achieve crime control or other utilitarian purposes. Convicts also 
retain First Amendment and other civil rights which may limit the form or 
conditions of punishment. 
C. Utilitarian Proportionality and Uniformity 
Sentencing proportionality and uniformity are usually linked to theories of 
retribution or just deserts, but they also have important utilitarian value.17 
When penalties for different crimes are proportional to the harms caused or 
threatened by those crimes, offenders have an incentive to stop at the lesser 
crime. Such proportionality also matches punishment costs with crime-control 
 
16. See generally VON HIRSCH, supra note 15. 
17. See generally Robinson & Darley, supra note 12. 
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benefits.18 In addition, more uniform sentencing permits more accurate 
forecasts of future prison populations and other correctional resource needs.19 
Denunciation and public respect are additional benefits of sentencing 
proportionality. As the punishment theorist H.L.A. Hart noted, if “the relative 
severity of penalties diverges sharply from this rough [proportionality] scale, 
there is a risk of either confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing 
the law into contempt.”20 In other words, disproportionate penalties undercut 
the law’s desired norm-reinforcing messages and reduce public respect for the 
criminal law and criminal justice systems. Such respect can help reduce crime. 
Research has shown that people are more likely to obey the law if they perceive 
the law and its processes to be fair.21 As discussed above, proportionality and 
uniformity of sentencing are based on widely shared fairness concerns, so 
highly disparate penalties are likely to reduce the public’s willingness to obey 
the law and cooperate with law enforcement. 
D. Conflicts Within and Across Punishment Principles 
The sentencing principles summarized above are all valid and widely 
recognized, but they often conflict with each other. In the example cited at the 
outset of this Article (Case No. 1), uniformity and proportionality principles 
require that two equally culpable offenders receive equally severe sanctions, 
despite one’s lower risk of reoffending. However, it is difficult to find a 
sanction that satisfies all relevant sentencing purposes. Sending both offenders 
to prison uses scarce prison space for a low-risk offender, may make that 
offender worse, and, if the crime is not serious, contradicts the desired norm-
reinforcing message conveyed by punishment. Putting both on probation fails 
to protect the public from the high-risk offender (at least without substantial 
increases in probation resources) and, if the crime is serious, fails to provide 
appropriate general deterrent and norm-reinforcing messages. 
Sentencing purposes conflict in many other ways. The following are three 
more examples: 
Case No. 2. Efforts to promote victim or community satisfaction and 
compensation may result in sanctions which, from a retributive and/or a crime-
control and efficiency standpoint, are either too severe (if the victim or 
community insist on more severity than other purposes require) or not severe 
enough (if the victim or community are forgiving or want to keep the offender 
out of prison in order to perform compensatory service or earn the money to 
 
18. See Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 593. 
19. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the important benefits of 
accurate resource-impact assessments in state guidelines systems).  
20. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 25 (1968). 
21. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 31, 64-68 (1990). 
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pay restitution). 
Case No. 3. An offender’s mental illness or drug addiction may greatly 
limit his capacity to obey the law, thus making him less blameworthy and less 
deserving of severe punishment. But the same offender characteristics make the 
offender very likely to reoffend, thus justifying a lengthy prison term. Mental 
health or treatment programs could, in theory, reduce the need for punishment 
severity in such cases while adequately assuring public safety, but, in the real 
world, such programs are all too often absent or severely underfunded. 
Case No. 4. Increased rates of imprisonment may heighten general 
deterrent and denunciation effects, but some of the additional offenders sent to 
prison will probably be made worse (i.e., more dangerous, less able to cope 
with freedom) than they were before entering prison. In theory this conflict can 
be resolved by balancing the positive and negative effects of increased rates of 
imprisonment, but this approach requires substantial data collection and 
calculation that courts are ill equipped to handle in day-to-day sentencing 
practice. 
How can these various conflicts be resolved by busy courts? The theory of 
limiting retributivism, discussed below, has been widely adopted and offers the 
best solution. 
II. RECONCILING CONFLICTING PUNISHMENT PRINCIPLES: LIMITING 
RETRIBUTIVISM 
The most serious conflicts among punishment principles occur between 
case-specific utilitarian purposes and just deserts principles. According to the 
latter, all offenders should receive their particular deserts—no more and no 
less. Such a system leaves very little room for consideration of other 
punishment purposes, and no jurisdiction in the United States or elsewhere has 
ever adopted such a one-dimensional approach. Instead, almost every system 
has adopted some form of what Norval Morris called “limiting retributivism” 
(also known as modified just deserts).22 Under this widely endorsed and 
adopted model, the offender’s desert defines a range of morally justified 
punishments, setting upper and lower limits on the severity of penalties that 
may fairly be imposed on a given offender. These upper and lower limits also 
promote the utilitarian benefits of uniformity and proportionality.23 Within the 
 
22. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 161, 182-87, 196-200 (1982) 
[hereinafter MORRIS, MADNESS]; cf. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO 
THE LEGISLATURE 9 (1980) (adopting modified just deserts approach). See generally Richard 
S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83, 90-104 (Michael 
Tonry ed., 2004) [hereinafter Frase, Limiting Retributivism] (discussing widespread support 
for basic elements of limiting retributivism); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in 
Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 365-78 (1997) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing 
Principles] (summarizing Morris’s theory of punishment and Minnesota’s approach). 
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21. 
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range of deserved penalties, case-specific incapacitation, rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and other sentencing goals may be pursued, but only to the extent 
that they are needed in a given case. Sentences within the desert range should 
be no more severe than necessary to achieve defined aims, a humane and 
utilitarian principle of necessity and efficiency which Morris referred to as 
“parsimony.”24 
Morris argued that desert can only define a range of penalties because the 
very concept of desert is inherently imprecise.25 In any given case there will be 
widespread agreement that certain penalties are clearly undeserved (because 
they are either excessively severe or excessively lenient). But there may be 
little political or philosophical consensus on the offender’s precise deserts, even 
relative to other offenders committing the same crime. 
But if a range of morally permissible penalties exists, why not sentence all 
offenders at the top of the range, or at least use that as the starting point in order 
to maximize crime-control effects? Morris’s opposite presumption, in favor of 
the least severe penalty in the range, is based on both moral and practical 
grounds.26 The moral arguments are analogous to those that underlie the 
requirement that guilt be established by elaborate trial procedures and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt: punishment intrudes on physical liberty and other 
very important rights, and the crime-control benefits of punishment are 
uncertain. Thus, the burden should be on the state to justify each additional 
increment of punishment severity. 
The practical arguments for preferring sentences less severe than the 
offender’s maximum desert flow not only from efficiency concerns (less 
severity is often adequate to achieve all utilitarian goals) but also from the 
pervasive need to encourage and reward cooperation from those accused of 
crime. Given the state’s limited resources and powers, there is a compelling 
need to obtain guilty pleas, waivers of jury trial and other rights, and 
cooperation in convicting other defendants. In addition, defendants placed on 
probation or parole must be encouraged to obtain and hold employment, 
support their dependents, make restitution, avoid risky places or behaviors, and 
accept treatment and supervision. Incarcerated defendants sent to prison or jail 
must have an incentive to cooperate with institutional rules and programs. 
Sentences must also leave room for backup sanctions—subsequent tightening 
of control (e.g., by revocation of probation or parole) if the defendant fails to 
cooperate—even if that failure is not, in itself, very blameworthy. Thus, in 
practice, modern systems of law enforcement and punishment always function 
 
24. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59-62 (1974) [hereinafter 
MORRIS, FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT]; Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 
595-97. 
25. MORRIS, MADNESS, supra note 22, at 198; see also NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL 
TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL 
SENTENCING SYSTEM 84-89, 104-05 (1990). 
26. MORRIS, FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, supra note 24, at 61. 
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according to a limiting retributive model under which most offenders, in return 
for their cooperation, receive less severe sanctions than the maximum they 
deserve. 
For all of these moral and practical reasons, limiting retributivism has been 
widely endorsed by scholars, model code drafters, legislators, sentencing 
commissions, judges, and practitioners.27 Desert-based limits on maximum 
sanction severity have received particularly broad support.28 Morris’s concept 
of parsimony—that sentences within the deserved range should be no more 
severe than needed to achieve all relevant utilitarian purposes—has been 
strongly promoted by utilitarian philosophers as far back as Beccaria and 
Bentham, and finds support in the Model Penal Code (the original version and 
recent proposed revisions), all three editions of the American Bar Association 
sentencing standards, and many fields of American law.29 
Some version of limiting retributivism has also been the basis for most 
contemporary sentencing laws.30 Indeterminate systems (still the most common 
sentencing regime) reflect a very loose version of this approach; most 
American sentencing guidelines systems embody a more precise and structured 
form of limiting retributivism.31 A range of allowable sanctions is provided for 
each case. The limits of sanction severity (tops and bottoms of the ranges) are 
scaled according to offense severity and prior conviction record, with the 
former usually having greater weight. Unlike the Federal Guidelines, state 
guidelines systems retain considerable sentencing flexibility, and mandatory 
minimum sentences are less prevalent and severe than in the federal system.32 
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in effect since 1980, represent a 
good example of limiting retributivism in operation.33 The modified just 
 
27. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 22, at 90-104; see also CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN AND REFORM OF SENTENCING SYSTEMS (2005) (noting 
that crime-control purposes should operate within upper and lower proportionality limits), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/si/Principles.doc (last visited Sept. 13, 2005) . 
28. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 22, at 92-93 (noting the support of 
influential writers such as H.L.A. Hart and the drafters of the Model Penal Code, recent 
proposals to revise the Code, and the two most recent editions of the American Bar 
Association’s sentencing standards). 
29. Id. at 94-95; see also Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 595-627 
(discussing many examples of principles akin to parsimony in United States constitutional 
law and in foreign and international law). 
30. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 22, at 95-104. 
31. Id. at 97-104; Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 22, at 407-30 (discussing 
the limiting retributive features of Minnesota’s guidelines); Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 
1 (arguing that the Federal Guidelines implicitly embody the modified just deserts model). 
32. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1198-1201, 1208 (2005) [hereinafter 
Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines]; see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in 
Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. 
SENT’G. REP. 69, 69, 76 (1999). 
33. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY (rev. Aug. 1, 2005), http://www 
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deserts sentencing philosophy adopted in Minnesota sets desert-based upper 
and lower limits on sanction severity, recognizes the principle of parsimony, 
leaves substantial scope for the application of non-desert sentencing purposes, 
retains substantial case-specific flexibility, and tailors overall sanction severity 
levels to available resources.34 Minnesota’s guidelines have achieved a stable 
and workable balance between the conflicting purposes and limitations of 
punishment. 
A. The Limits of the Criminal Law as an Instrument of Crime Control  
For most offenses and offenders, the crime-control effects of punishment 
probably are quite limited.35 One of the most important factors determining the 
deterrent effect of sanctions is the probability of punishment.36 But the 
detection rates for most crimes are very low, and the probability of an offender 
receiving a custody sentence is often less than one out of every one hundred 
crimes committed.37 Low detection, conviction, and incarceration rates also 
severely limit the effectiveness of criminal sanctions designed to achieve 
rehabilitation or incapacitation. Moreover, each of these crime-control 
mechanisms relies on numerous additional assumptions which often do not 
prove true.38 
The crime-control effects are likely to be particularly limited for many 
federal crimes. Although separate data on federal crimes are not available, there 
is no reason to believe that crime-detection rates are higher for federal crimes 
than for other crimes. Moreover, police and prosecutors are very selective in 
deciding what to make a federal case.39 Federal criminal law often overlaps 
 
.msgc.state.mn.us/Guidelines/guide05.DOC (last visited Sept. 13, 2005). See generally 
Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 22. 
34.  Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 22, at 388-430. See generally Richard S. 
Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & JUST. 131 (2005). 
Although Minnesota’s guidelines retain substantial case-level flexibility, sentencing 
practices are sufficiently uniform to permit the Minnesota Guidelines Commission to make 
accurate forecasts of the impact of changes in guidelines or statutes on future prison 
populations and other correctional resources. Such resource-impact assessments have 
allowed Minnesota to set priorities in prison use and avoid prison overcrowding. Id. at 146-
47, 204-05. Several other guidelines states have taken a similar approach, but resource-
impact assessments have never played any significant role in the federal system. Frase, State 
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1198, 1216-19. 
35. For further discussion, Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and 
Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2005) (in this Issue). 
36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
37. See, e.g., CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 57 (David Farrington et 
al. eds., 2004) (showing U.S. custody rates per 1000 crimes committed for various crimes). 
38. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11. In contrast, early childhood intervention 
and other crime-preventive measures outside the criminal justice system have been found to 
be quite effective. See Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1219 n.138. 
39. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision To File Federal Criminal Charges: A 
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with state law, so federal law officers can defer to state authorities. Even where 
federal criminal jurisdiction is exclusive (for example, in many areas of 
regulatory crime and crime committed against the federal government), 
criminal prosecution is usually reserved for aggravated or persistent 
violations.40 In recent years, a large proportion of suspects prosecuted in 
federal courts were charged with drug violations,41 but about ten times as many 
drug offenders were prosecuted in state courts.42 Given the clandestine nature 
of drug use and drug trafficking, it seems likely that detection rates are at least 
as low for these offenses as for most other crimes. Furthermore, drug crimes 
are very hard to deter, since they are often motivated by addiction, high profits 
(maintained by supply-side enforcement), and/or lack of attractive lawful 
activities. White-collar and regulatory offenders are more likely to be deterred, 
even by selective enforcement and modest penalties; such offenders have many 
lawful alternatives and much to lose from being convicted, regardless of the 
penalty. But the highly selective use of criminal penalties in such cases raises 
very serious uniformity problems. When offenders appear to have been unfairly 
singled out, respect for the law and law enforcement suffers.43 
B. Illustrative Cases  
The four examples of conflicting sentencing purposes described above can 
be used to illustrate how sentencing guidelines based on the limiting retributive 
model can help provide resolution. The first step is to determine whether the 
top and bottom of the recommended guidelines range need to be adjusted to 
account for factors which increase or decrease the seriousness of the conviction 
offense. Applying the parsimony principle, the sentencing judge then begins at 
 
Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 252 tbl.1 (1980) 
[hereinafter Frase, Decision To File] (finding that from 1974 to 1978, approximately 22% of 
criminal matters were prosecuted). Recent published reports show higher federal prosecution 
rates. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING 2002, 
at 9 tbl.3 (2005) (noting that 73% of suspects investigated were prosecuted). However, these 
data exclude matters on which attorneys spent less than one hour of time. Id. at 17. In earlier 
years Justice Department data included all matters received from investigating agencies, 
producing much lower prosecution rates. See Frase, Decision To File, supra (citing Justice 
Department statistical reports); see also id. at 254, 321 (finding that in the Northern District 
of Illinois, half of matters were immediately declined, and only 14% of these were declined 
because no federal crime appeared to have been committed). 
40. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 39, at 9 (finding a 62% declination 
rate for regulatory crime). As discussed in note 39, supra, more complete data from earlier 
years suggests that true declination rates are much higher than recent published rates. 
41. Id. at 10 (noting 30,673 drug defendants in 2002, comprising 35% of defendants 
prosecuted in federal courts). 
42. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 2 
(2004) (finding that an estimated 340,330 defendants were charged with drug crimes in state 
courts). 
43. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
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the low end of the adjusted range and increases sentencing severity until all 
applicable case-specific utilitarian sentencing purposes have been satisfied. 
Case No. 1.44 In this example, two offenders are identical in everything but 
the risk of reoffending. This case is easily resolved by the state guidelines 
limiting retributive model. Within the adjusted range, offenders may receive 
unequal punishments based on risk assessments. The lower and upper 
boundaries limit unfairly lenient or severe sentences and satisfy utilitarian 
(general deterrent and denunciation) needs for uniformity and proportionality. 
Case No. 2.45 This example highlights a conflict between the needs of 
victims and the community, on the one hand, and just desert values and/or 
crime-control goals, on the other. Again, the upper and lower adjusted range 
boundaries address uniformity and proportionality concerns. Within the range, 
case-specific crime control and victim or community needs may all be 
considered; whatever purpose calls for the greatest sanction will prevail unless 
the legislature provides that a particular purpose should receive priority and 
should trump the others. 
Case No. 3. This example involved a high-risk offender with substantially 
diminished capacity to obey the law due to mental illness or addiction. Fairness 
to the offender, as well as the utilitarian advantages of uniformity and 
proportionality, require a desert-based upper limit on allowable punishment 
severity. If this limit appears inadequate to ensure public safety, mental health 
or other noncriminal alternatives can be invoked; public safety imperatives, 
combined with upper desert limits, give the legislature an incentive to provide 
the necessary alternatives. 
Case No. 4. This example posited a conflict between the need for increased 
deterrence (for instance, because of a recent increase in frequency of the crime) 
and the risk of damaging vulnerable offenders. The latter risk is lessened by the 
upper range limits and by the court’s discretion within the range to give a 
shorter prison or jail term (or, where authorized, a noncustodial sentence) to 
offenders who appear particularly vulnerable.46 
CONCLUSION 
Many legitimate purposes and limitations apply to punishment decisions. 
These purposes and limits require both discretion to tailor sentences to 
particular offense and offender circumstances and substantial limitations on 
 
44. This case is described supra in the Introduction of this Article and is further 
discussed supra at the end of Part I. 
45. Cases 2, 3, and 4 are described supra at the end of Part I. 
46. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Minn. 1981) (approving 
probation, jail, and treatment, in lieu of a presumptive twenty-three to twenty-five-month 
prison term, where the defendant was very amenable to treatment on probation and his 
immaturity would cause him to be easily victimized or led into crime if he were sent to 
prison). 
FRASE PUNISHMENT PURPOSES 58 STAN. L. REV. 67 10/28/2005 1:24:58 PM 
82 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:67 
that discretion. It is intolerable to allow three identical offenders to receive very 
different sanction severity because one judge believes in community-based 
treatment, one believes in proportionality limits, and one believes in using very 
lengthy prison terms for deterrence. It is likewise intolerable to force judges to 
impose identical sentences when different penalties are warranted. Sentencing 
judges must have guided discretion, and they must be clear about which 
purposes they are pursuing and with what priority. When defining the limits of 
the sentencing judge’s discretion, legislatures, sentencing commissions, and 
appellate courts must likewise be clear about purposes and priorities. 
The principles of sentencing uniformity and proportionality reflect widely 
shared fairness concerns and have great practical value. But these principles are 
often in conflict with case-specific crime-control and restorative justice goals, 
and the two latter purposes often conflict with each other. The theory of 
limiting retributivism has broad support and provides a workable means of 
harmonizing all of the important purposes and limitations of punishment. State 
guidelines, such as those in Minnesota, provide good examples of successful 
limiting retributive systems in operation.47 
The Federal Guidelines are not based on limiting retributivism,48 but courts 
or Congress could easily adapt the Guidelines to that model. Justice Breyer’s 
remedy opinion in Booker directs courts to give particular emphasis to the 
statement of sentencing purposes and other factors in section 3553(a) of the 
Guidelines-enabling statute.49 That section clearly shows that Congress 
preferred a hybrid theory of sentencing purposes, and it strongly suggests that 
Congress had something like limiting retributivism in mind. 
Section 3553(a) begins with a statement of the parsimony principle,50 and 
paragraph 1 specifies that sentences should be based on both offense and 
offender factors. Paragraph 2 then lists the principal sentencing purposes courts 
should consider—paragraph 2A appears to endorse proportionality values,51 
and paragraphs 2B to 2D recognize deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.52 Later paragraphs endorse sentencing uniformity and 
restitution.53 As shown in this Article, the purposes listed in section 3553(a) are 
 
47. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1211; Hofer & Allenbaugh, 
supra note 1, at 24. 
48. But see Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 1 (arguing that a form of limiting 
retributivism is implicit in the Guidelines). 
49. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-66 (2005). 
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (stating that the sentence should be sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection). 
51. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (stating that courts shall consider the need for the sentence to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense). 
52. Id. § 3553(a), ¶¶ 2B-2D. 
53. Paragraphs 3 through 5 of § 3553(a) direct courts to consider available penalties 
and the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines and policy statements. Paragraphs 6 and 7 cite 
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in conflict, but they can be harmonized under a limiting retributive model. 
Indeed, the structure of section 3553(a) strongly implies this model: the 
parsimony and proportionality principles are stated first, suggesting that they 
set overall limits on the crime-control and other purposes which follow. 
The limiting retributive model would bring much-needed coherence to 
federal sentencing law. In the absence of further congressional action, federal 
trial and appellate courts should interpret section 3553(a) consistently with this 
model, using the Guidelines ranges, case-specific aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and other considerations54 to define proportionality limits 
within which all other sentencing purposes operate, subject to the overall 
requirement of parsimony. Of course, it would be preferable for Congress to 
explicitly endorse the limiting retributive model. Section 3553(a) could easily 
be rewritten to achieve this result, separately stating the three critical elements 
of this model: outer proportionality limits, crime-control and other case-specific 
considerations operating within those limits, and the principle of parsimony.55 
Whether in federal or state court, sentencing must accommodate a variety 
of punishment purposes and limitations. The theory of limiting retributivism 
provides the best means to reconcile and give appropriate weight to all of these 
purposes and limitations. This approach is the basis for most contemporary 
sentencing laws, and its essential elements have been widely endorsed by 
scholars, model code drafters, sentencing commissions, and practitioners. As 
implemented in Minnesota and other guidelines states during the past twenty-
five years, limiting retributivism has proven to be theoretically sound, well-
balanced, flexible, and practically viable. 
 
the need to avoid unwarranted disparities and to provide restitution to victims. 
54. Cf. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 651 (suggesting that the 
Eighth Amendment and other constitutional proportionality principles could be adapted to 
help federal courts define subconstitutional proportionality standards under § 3553(a)). 
55. For a clear statement of these three elements, see MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004). 
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